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In the course of governing, a legislature or administrative agency fre-
quently intervenes in private economic affairs. That intervention may take
the form of an appropriation of private property for public use or of a
change in the rules that govern a private activity. The issue of compensat-
ing individuals who incur economic losses as a result of such government
action is adjudicated in the courts under the Fifth Amendment' and under
similar provisions of state constitutions,2 and is debated in the legislatures
on grounds of public policy.' Although no systematic theoretical founda-
tion underlies these judicial4 and legislative' deliberations, commentators
1. U.S. CONsT. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just com-
pensation"). The economic loss can be the loss of a physical asset as in the case of an expropriation,
e.g., Sioux Nation of Indians v. United States, 601 F.2d 1157 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (United States must pay
compensation for land it appropriated from Sioux Indians), or it can be a reduction in the profitability
of an enterprise, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (ordinance prohibiting
excavation below water table does not constitute compensable taking from owner of quarry). Theoreti-
cally, the distinction between the two types of loss is only a matter of degree. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413-14 (1922).
2. Some state constitutions use the phrase "taken or damaged" rather than "taken" in their com-
pensation provisions. E.g., MO. CONST. art. 1, § 26. See generally 2A P. NICHOLS, EMINENT Do-
MAIN § 6.44 (rev. 3d ed. 1976). These clauses have been held to expand the range of compensable
losses attributable to governmental action. Id. §§ 6.44, .441.
3. E.g., 118 CONG. REC. 24,874-89 (1972) (House debate over bill to indemnify individuals who
sustained losses as result of ban on cyclamates); 117 CONG. REc. 40,046-56 (1971) (House debate
over indemnification provision of Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, 7 U.S.C.
§ 136m (1976)).
4. See F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES, & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 195 (1973) (most scholars
have failed to discern pattern in takings cases since 1920s) [hereinafter cited as F. BOSSELMAN]; Dun-
ham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law,
1962 SuP. CT. REV. 63, 63 ("crazy-quilt pattern of Supreme Court doctrine on the law of expropria-
tion"); Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condemnation
Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1970) (distinction between valid police power measures and
takings without compensation lacks theoretical rationale).
5. See, e.g., 118 CONG. REC. 24,878 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Donohue) (compensation should not
be provided to individuals who sustained losses as result of cyclamate ban because government's action
was "valid and necessary" and "the Government should not be required to pay damages unless it has
committed a wrong"); 118 CONG. REC. 24,877 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Steiger) (compensation should
be provided to individuals who suffered losses as result of cyclamate ban because ban was "totally
unexpected"); 117 CONG. REC. 40,055 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Poage) (if government destroys prop-
erty values, by banning dangerous pesticide, it must pay owner); id. at 40,037 (remarks of Rep.
Abzug) ("Do we indemnify a bank robber if we catch him and take away his ill-gotten loot? If not,
then why should we indemnify a manufacturer when we catch him with his ill-gotten 'loot'?"). In
some cases, however, individual congressmen have tried to impose an analytic structure on their delib-
erations. See, e.g., 118 CONG. REC. 24,880 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Drinan) (addressing general
implications of allowing businessmen to rely on government to compensate them for investments in
products that cause injury and disease); 117 CONG. REC. 40,046 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Evans)
(same). Typically, these attempts have failed to focus the debates.
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have identified the elimination of uncertainty over adverse government ac-
tion as one goal of compensation law.6 Moreover, in isolated debates, Con-
gressmen have adverted to the elimination of uncertainty as a factor that
weighs in favor of compensating individuals who are harmed by govern-
ment action.
7
This Note adopts the assumption of Professor Frank Michelman's utili-
tarian model of just compensation' that uncertainty over adverse govern-
ment action should be considered in the compensation decision. The Note
departs from that model, however, in arguing that the analysis of uncer-
tainty requires an assessment of the societal effect of uncertainty, rather
than of the direct cost of uncertainty to the uncertain individuals. It also
argues that the logic of the model applies to the compensability of govern-
ment-induced deprivation of jobs as well as to the compensability of such
deprivation of traditionally recognized "property" rights.9 The Note then
develops a framework for the analysis of the societal effect of uncertainty
in the compensation context.' 0 It argues that once attention shifts to the
societal effect of uncertainty, the importance of eliminating this uncer-
tainty depends on who is rendered uncertain, and on a variety of circum-
stances surrounding the uncertainty-creating action." The Note concludes
6. B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 44-46, 74 (1977) (Appeal to Gen-
eral Uncertainty); Michelman, Properly, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations
of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214 (1967) (impaired incentives); William-
son, Administrative Decision Making and Pricing: Externality and Compensation Analysis Applied,
in THE ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC OUTPUT 115, 119-20 (J. Margolis ed. 1970) (uncertainty regarding
future redistributions by government is part of Michelman's "demoralization cost").
7. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 307, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 31-33 (1979) (deep seabed investments' vul-
nerability to future Law of the Sea treaty is uncertain, but treaty should provide "grandfather clause,"
rather than compensation for lost investments); 117 CONG. REC. 40,050-51 (1971) (remarks of Rep.
Poage) (uncertainty is concern in issue of compensating owners of banned pesticides).
8. Michelman, supra note 6.
9. Because the Fifth Amendment requires just compensation only when "property" is taken,
workers have no constitutional right to compensation under current interpretation. Congress, however,
has provided compensation to workers who lose their jobs as a result of government action. See, e.g.,
Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-236, §§ 501-505, 87 Stat. 1012-12 (1974)
(codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 771-775 (1976)) (providing protection to employees adversely affected by
reorganization of railroads into Consolidated Rail Corporation); Amendment to Act Establishing Red-
wood National Park, Pub. L. No. 95-250, §§ 102-103, 92 Stat. 166-70 (1978) (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 791k-791m (Supp. III 1979)) (providing that employees adversely affected by expansion of Red-
woods National Park shall be placed in other jobs); cf Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L.
No. 92-500, § 507(e), 86 Stat. 890 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1267(e) (1976)) (any employee
allegedly laid off because of effluent limitation entitled to public hearing by Environmental Protection
Agency).
10. This Note does not discuss the institutional structure within which compensation decisions
should be made. The analysis could be applied to legislative decisions grounded in the public interest
or judicial decisions based on just compensation clauses. The utilitarian basis of the Note is consistent
with an accepted role of legislatures. See, e.g., J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF
CONSENT (1962). In the context of constitutional adjudication, however, utilitarianism might have to
be incorporated into the term "just" in the Fifth Amendment before the present analysis could be fully
adopted. See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 41-42. But see note 13 infra (philosophical support for
model beyond utilitarianism).
11. As the effect of a failure to compensate individuals who are harmed by government action is
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by applying the framework to the congressional decision to compensate
individuals who own stocks of a pesticide banned by the Environmental
Protection Agency. 2
I. The Uncertainty Effect and the Utilitarian Model of the Compensa-
tion Decision
Whenever the government undertakes an action that imposes a loss on
an individual or group of individuals, the legislature or agency involved
presumably has determined that the direct benefits of the action outweigh
the direct costs. Although society is better off if the government undertakes
the action, some individuals may be rendered worse off. When this occurs,
the issue of compensating the losers arises.
The utilitarian model of compensation13 provides that individuals who
are harmed by government action should be compensated whenever the
social cost of providing compensation is less than the social cost of al-
lowing individuals to remain uncompensated. t4 Among the societal ef-
fects15 of failing to compensate individuals who are harmed by government
only one element of the compensation decision, see note 15 infra, the result of the uncertainty effect
analysis can only weigh for or against compensation. It alone cannot solve the compensation problem.
The same framework can be applied to the decision whether to compensate individuals for losses
that are generated by private or natural forces. These types of uncertainty commonly differ from
uncertainty over government action, because individuals can frequently protect themselves against pri-
vately generated or natural losses through private markets. Cf Michelman, supra note 6, at 1169 n.5
(limiting compensation analysis to context of government-induced losses); Sax, Takings and the Police
Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 65-66 (1964) (distinguishing between risks of adverse government action and
adverse private action in context of compensation). If such protection is not available and if the gov-
ernment must decide whether to act as an insurer, the framework developed in this Note is applicable.
12. Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-136y (1976 & Supp. III
1979).
13. The utilitarian model of compensation was originally developed by Professor Frank
Michelman, see Michelman supra note 6, and later refined by Professor Bruce Ackerman, see B.
ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 44-49. Professor Michelman argues that this model is not only utilita-
rian, but that in many cases it is also just, as defined by Professor John Rawls' concept of "justice as
fairness." Michelman, supra note 6, at 1218-24. This Note takes no position on that point, as it does
not attempt to interpret the term "just" under the Fifth Amendment.
14. Michelman, supra note 6, at 1215. If the direct net social benefit of a government action is not
large enough to outweigh either the social cost of compensation or the social cost of failing to compen-
sate-whichever is lower-then the government should not take the action in the first place. Id.
15. Professor Michelman refers to "demoralization costs" as the social cost of failing to compen-
sate individuals who are harmed by government action. Demoralization costs include the ill will of
individuals who believe that the cost of government action should not be borne disproportionately by
those individuals who incur losses as a direct result of the action. Id. at 1214. Professor Ackerman
refers to this aspect of demoralization costs as "the cost of citizen disaffection." B. ACKERMAN, supra
note 6, at 46-48. Michelman's demoralization costs also include the uncertainty that people experience
over their own vulnerability to future adverse government action. Michelman, supra note 6, at 1214.
Professor Ackerman refers to this cost as the "cost of general uncertainty," which includes the social
utility loss attributable to uncertainty in the economy regarding government action that will adversely
affect some individuals. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 44-45. Professor Ackerman and other com-
mentators have identified additional costs of noncompensable government action. First, there is the
risk that government decisions under such a regime will not accurately take account of social costs. Id.
at 52-53; Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 165, 223 (1974);
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action is the creation of uncertainty among those individuals and among
others similarly situated. 6 Individual responses to this uncertainty have a
variety of effects on the rest of society, both positive and negative. The
government can alter those responses by establishing a precedent or policy
of fully compensating individuals for losses sustained by a given type of
government action. 7 Because the utilitarian model of compensation bal-
ances the net social cost of failing to compensate against the net social cost
of providing compensation, the societal effect of uncertainty must inform
each government decision to establish a precedent or policy of compensat-
ing affected individuals.
A. The Creation of Uncertainty and the Social Cost of Compensation
The threat of adverse government action renders uncertain an individ-
ual's return from either his job 8 or his physical or financial assets. Uncer-
tainty over the prospect of government-imposed losses arises in two
ways. 19 First, many instances of government action are foreshadowed by
Dunham, From Rural Enclosure to Re-enclosure of Urban Land, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1238, 1253-54
(1960); Sax, supra note 11, at 65. Second, if there is a choice of who must bear the cost of the
government action, the official responsible for selecting the unfortunate individuals may be susceptible
to unfair political or personal pressure from people seeking to avoid the harm. B. ACKERMAN, supra
note 6, at 52-53; Sax, supra note 11, at 64-65.
16. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 48-49, 74 (1977) (Appeal to General Uncertainty);
Michelman, supra note 6, at 1214 (impaired incentives); Williamson, supra note 6, at 119-20 (uncer-
tainty regarding future redistributions by government is part of Michelman's "demoralization cost").
The definition of "uncertainty" used in this Note is different from that used in formal financial
analysis. Here, the imposition of uncertainty by the government refers to an increase in the
probability that the return from an activity will be lower than that previously expected. In financial
terms, this consists of a reduction in the mean and an increase in the variance of the probability
distribution of the activity's returns. Reference to the increased "riskiness" of an activity refers to the
same phenomenon.
17. Full compensation is defined as the amount of money that would have to be paid to an indi-
vidual who has sustained a government-imposed loss in order to make him indifferent between his
situation before and after sustaining the loss. Michelman, supra note 6, at 1214; see Downs, Uncom-
pensated Nonconstruction Costs Which Urban Highways and Urban Renewal Impose Upon Residen-
tial Households, in THE ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC OUTPUT 69, 79-90 U. Margolis ed. 1970) (basic princi-
ple of compensation is to make people whole). In practice, it is likely to be difficult to apply a true
full-compensation rule. The value that each individual places on an asset impaired by government
action would have to be discerned, and idiosyncratic valuation would have to be honored. In most
cases, the measure of compensation would probably be market value. This does not present a funda-
mental problem for the model as it can be extended to take into account the possibility of paying less
than full compensation without disturbing its basic form. See Williamson, supra note 6, at 124. For
simplicity, however, this Note assumes that full compensation is provided.
18. Congress has authorized compensation to workers who lose their jobs as a result of govern-
ment action. See note 9 supra. Although the courts have not recognized a worker's loss of earning
power as a compensable "taking" under the Fifth Amendment, there is nothing in the logic of the
utilitarian model of just compensation that precludes compensation in such a context.
19. Although uncertainty may be a purposeful effect of adverse government action, it may also be
incidental. Cf Wolfe, A Theory of Nonmarket Failure: Framework for Implementation Analysis, 22
J.L. & ECON. 107, 126-28 (1979) ("derived externalities" of government action). In either case, the
decisionmaker should evaluate its effect.
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preparatory conduct by the government.2" During the preparatory stage,
the specific nature of the action and the specific subset of society that will
bear its cost are unknown. In fact, part of the government's preparation
may be the determination of what harm is to be imposed on which indi-
viduals. Thus, anyone engaged in an activity that could be harmed by the
anticipated action experiences uncertainty over the continued profitability
of that activity."z
Second, when the government takes an adverse action and fails to com-
pensate those adversely affected, uncertainty arises over future uncompen-
sated losses of a similar nature.2 A given adverse action may signal future
adverse actions of a similiar sort, and a failure to compensate may be
perceived as a precedent.23 As a result, the profitability of jobs or capital
thought to be vulnerable to a future noncompensable government action
becomes uncertain. 4
20. For instance, the negotiation of the Law of the Sea Treaty cast a pall of uncertainty over the
mining of the deep seabed. Recognizing this phenomenon, Congress considered action that would
alleviate uncertainty and would allow the continued development of technology that would facilitate
the exploitation of deep seabed resources. S. 493, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S1789 (daily
ed. Feb. 26, 1979) (providing legal structure for investment, and expressing congressional desire that
future treaty leave investments unimpaired); H.R. 2759, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC.
H1220 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1979) (same). An earlier form of these bills provided compensation to
individuals whose investments are impaired by the Law of the Sea Treaty, but that provision was
omitted in the most recent bill. See S. REP. No. 307, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1979) (expression of
congressional intent to avoid impairment of investments sufficient to alleviate uncertainty without
compensation).
21. For instance, when an urban renewal project is being considered, a period of investigation and
discussion frequently precedes designation of the site to be condemned. Until a location is chosen and
the specific nature of the project is announced, individuals with interests in the status quo throughout
the area under consideration will be uncertain about whether their interests will be adversely affected.
See Downs, supra note 17, at 79-90 ("announcement effect").
22. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 44 (when individuals observe that property rights have been
redistributed, they will become uncertain about future redistributions); Michelman, supra note 6, at
1214 (same); Williamson, supra note 6, at 125 (same). But see Sax, Takings, Private Property, and
Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 180-81 (1971) (uncertainty regarding adverse government action
should be irrelevant to compensation decision because property owners frequently bear risk).
23. The phenomenon of uncertainty emanating from government action that imposes losses on
some individuals has also been recognized in the area of tax reform. See, e.g., Feldstein, On the
Theory of Tax Reform, 6 J. PUB. ECON. 77, 93 (1976) (changes in tax laws make people uncertain
about future stability of tax law, which causes them to engage in precautionary behavior); McIntyre,
Transition Rules: Learning to Live with Tax Reform, 4 TAX NOTES, Aug. 30, 1976, at 7, 12 (uncer-
tainty about change is price that must be paid); Note, Setting Effective Dates for Tax Legislation: A
Rule of Prospectivity, 84 HARV. L. REV. 436, 439 (1970) (taxpayers must have confidence that they
can structure their affairs with assurance that their plans will not be frustrated by subsequent changes
in tax laws). But see Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision,
126 U. PA. L. REV. 47, 65 (1977) (risk of change in law no different from market risks and should
not be policy concern).
The converse of the uncertainty problem analyzed in this Note may arise from the incomplete
enforcement of regulatory laws. In that context, an activity may be more profitable than it would be if
a law were strictly enforced. See, e.g., Dunham, supra note 15, at 1251 (because people's estimates of
risk enter into price of land, prices of buildings that are valueless according to housing codes are
positive because of chance that municipality will not enforce code).
24. For instance, if a new emission limit is placed on a pollutant, individuals who are engaged in
activities that require the emission of that pollutant, or one with similar properties, are likely to
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The establishment of a policy or precedent of providing full compensa-
tion for specific government-induced losses would eliminate the uncer-
tainty that otherwise would follow the imposition or preparation for the
imposition of such losses.2  Full compensation, however, entails social
costs: although the amount of money given to the injured individuals is not
a social cost-it is simply a transfer from one sector of society to an-
other-the administration of the compensation program is socially costly.26
Thus, in deciding whether to provide compensation, the decisionmaker
must assess the societal effect of uncertainty regarding similar adverse
governmental action in the future.27
become uncertain about further effluent limitations. Of course, the nature and scope of the uncertainty
depend upon the context in which the initial regulation was promulgated.
25. See note 17 supra (defining full compensation). When people perceive that government activ-
ity foreshadows an adverse government action, or when a legal structure is established that will allow
the government to undertake specific actions that would adversely affect some individuals, the promise
of full compensation, if apd when losses occur, will eliminate the uncertainty effect. Downs, supra
note 17, at 70, 79 (promise of compensation eliminates uncertainty). Similarly, the precedential value
of the provision of compensation can eliminate the uncertainty effect that otherwise would follow the
imposition of those losses, and a statement by the court, legislature, or agency articulating the scope of
losses considered to be similarly compensable would clarify the compensabilty of similar, but not
identical, losses in the future. Once a precedent or policy is established for providing compensation for
a given type of government-imposed loss, neither the imposition nor the preparation for imposing such
a loss on an individual will generate an uncertainty effect. See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 44
(compensation eliminates uncertainty); Michelman, supra note 6, at 1214 (compensation eliminates
demoralization); Williamson, supra note 6, at 120-21 (same).
The ability of the government to use compensation to eliminate the uncertainty that follows an
adverse government action is merely asserted by Michelman and Ackerman. At least until a firm
compensation policy or set of precedents is in place, it seems reasonable as an empirical matter that
the provision of compensation in one instance will not allay all uncertainty that compensation will be
provided in similar instances. It is also reasonable to assume, however, that the provision of compensa-
tion coupled with a statement of the policy behind the decision to compensate will reduce uncertainty
regarding a similar but uncompensated adverse government action in the future. If uncertainty is only
partially eliminated by the provision of compensation, the focus of this analysis merely shifts to the
societal effect of the expected reduction of uncertainty rather than the elimination of uncertainty. See
Williamson, supra note 6, at 124 (extension of compensation model to allow for possibility of imper-
fect compensation). For simplicity, this Note assumes that compensation will eliminate uncertainty.
26. The administrative cost includes the cost of distinguishing between the people who should and
who should not receive compensation, calculating or bargaining for the amount they should receive,
and disbursing the payments. Michelman, supra note 6, at 1214 n.99. This cost will be greater than
the cost of measuring the social costs required by the compensation model. Whereas the assessments
called for by the model are aggregate estimates, those that would have to be made in implementing a
full compensation program must be individualized. Because each claim must be scrutinized for accu-
racy and veracity, the cost of carrying out a compensation program can be substantial.
27. The provision of compensation will also eliminate the other effects of adverse government
action. See note 15 supra. Disaffection will be alleviated because the individuals who bear the brunt of
the government action will not believe that the state is operating under a theory of politics different
from their own. B. AcKERMAN, supra note 6, at 46-48. The risk that the agency responsible for the
action will not take into account the full social cost of its action will be alleviated because the agency
will have to pay the full social cost of the action. Id. at 51; Sax, supra note 11, at 65. Some legislators
have turned this aspect of compensation into a disadvantage. See S. REP. No. 307, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 31 (1979) (compensation imposes "additional burden" on government decisionmaker who is con-
sidering action that imposes loss on private individuals); 117 CONG. REC. 40,052 (1971) (remarks of
Rep. Evans) (same). Finally, compensation will eliminate the risk that improper or corrupt political
activity will surround the decision to impose losses on someone, because the incentive for individuals
to engage in such activity will be absent. Sax, supra note 11, at 65.
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B. The Societal Effect of Uncertainty
Professor Michelman, in his utilitarian model of compensation, treats
uncertainty as a "cost" of failing to compensate an individual who is ad-
versely affected by government action." This treatment stems from his
focus on the cost of uncertainty to the uncertain indivdual, rather than on
the societal impact of uncertainty.29 Thus his approach is inconsistent with
the goal of basing the compensation decision on a societal cost-benefit
calculus. Although uncertainty over adverse government action does re-
present a cost to the uncertain individual,"0 its effect on society depends on
that individual's response. Faced with the uncertain prospect of bearing
the cost of a government action, an individual is likely to spend time and
money to avoid or to mitigate his anticipated loss.' t If a risk-reducing
course of action is found that is sufficiently inexpensive, he is likely to
follow that course of action.12 That response will affect other people, and
may set in motion a chain reaction that has social value unrelated to the
individual's cost of uncertainty.
3
28. See Michelman, supra note 6, at 1214. See also B. ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 44-45 (treat-
ing uncertainty as cost); Williamson, supra note 6, at 119-21 (same).
29. See Michelman, supra note 6, at 1215-18. See also B. ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 44
(Appeal to General Uncertainty based on fact that institutional decision that increases uncertainty
imposes costs upon all citizens who already find social environment too risky). Ackerman's focus on
the individual's cost of uncertainty leads him to adopt an incorrect method of assessing the "cost of
uncertainty." He states that as the cost of risk-reducing strategies increases, the appeal to general
uncertainty becomes more important. Id. at 44-45. Ackerman ignores the possibility that the individ-
ual's response to uncertainty can impose on others costs or benefits that are unrelated to the cost he
bears in carrying out his response. But see id. at 206 n.6 (referring in passing to these effects as
"second order").
As Ackerman asserts, the cost of insurance and the cost of reducing participation in the uncertain
activity are related to the effect of uncertainty; they are not related, however, in the way he asserts.
Viewed from the perspective of the social impact of uncertainty, these costs are significant in that they
make different types of responses more or less likely to occur. See pp. 1679-82 infra. The relationship
between response costs and the cost of uncertainty could very well be an inverse relationship. As
response costs decline, it becomes more likely that there will be an active response, and that the effect
of the uncertainty will spread beyond those initially rendered uncertain. In order to relate these costs
to the social cost of uncertainty in any particular instance, it is necessary to predict the chain of effects
triggered by the government-induced uncertainty, and to assess the cost of the entire effect.
30. This loss is represented by the subjective probability that the adverse government action will
occur, multiplied by the loss that will be imposed by the action, and a factor that represents the degree
to which the uncertain individual is risk averse.
31. Cf. R. RIE;EL, J. MILLER, & C. WILLIAMS, INSURANCE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES: PROP-
ERTY AND LIABILITY 4-6 (6th ed. 1976) (methods of meeting risk).
32. A risk-reducing strategy is sufficiently inexpensive if the amount that is expected to be saved
by the strategy, discounted by the probability that the strategy will be successful, is greater than the
cost of the strategy.
33. For example, consider a group of merchants in a town near a military base. If uncertainty is
created over the closing of the base, either by the closing of another base or by a Defense Department
decision to study the possibility of closing military bases, then the merchants' expected income will be
reduced and made more risky. They will have incurred a loss as a result of the uncertainty itself. The
merchants' response may be to mitigate their potential loss by ceasing to spend any money on capital
improvement of their shops. This response would impose on the community the external cost of the
shops' dilapidation. Thus, merely by creating uncertainty over the closing of the military base, the
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When attention shifts to the societal effects of uncertainty, it becomes
clear that uncertainty over such effects must be scrutinized in each situa-
tion before a conclusion can be reached about the desirability of the uncer-
tainty. For example, if the uncertain individual can shield himself from
the risk of adverse government action without imposing costs on others,
the uncertainty may be inconsequential from a societal point of view. Fur-
thermore, from this perspective the uncertainty need not be a social cost.
If the uncertain individual's reaction to uncertainty is socially desirable,
his cost may lead to society's benefit.
II. A Framework for Assessing the Uncertainty Effect
The uncertainty generated by adverse government action can simply re-
duce the expected profitability of affected activities, or it can induce those
engaged in such activities to take measures to lessen their risk. In either
situation, the individual's loss is a social cost; in the latter case, however,
the net effect of uncertainty on society is compounded by the social value
of the uncertain individual's response. The nature of that response to un-
certainty depends on the cost of his bearing the uncertainty and on the
relative cost of uncertainty-reducing courses of action.
A. The Individual's Cost of Uncertainty
The cost of uncertainty to the individual is the expectational loss gener-
ated by the risk that he will sustain damage as a result of a given type of
government action.' That cost depends upon two factors: the magnitude
and the perceived probability of the harm that the individual expects to
sustain as a result of the anticipated government action, and the level of
the individual's aversion to risk. These factors determine the extent to
which the individual is made worse off solely by the onset of the risk that
he will incur a government-imposed loss."
Ignoring the risk preference of the uncertain individual, the expecta-
tional loss is equal to the magnitude of the anticipated losses multiplied by
the perceived probability that those losses will be incurred. To evaluate
these factors, the decisionmaker must examine the circumstances that sur-
round the uncertainty-triggering action. An initial adverse government ac-
government has imposed individual costs on the merchants, plus diffuse costs on the community. See
p. 1680 infra (effect of allowing assets to depreciate).
34. See R. RIE(;EL, J. MILLER, & C. WILLIAMS, supra note 31, at 3 (uncertainty is one cost).
35. The more an individual expects to lose when the adverse government action occurs and the
higher the probability he places on the action's occurrence, the greater will be the expectational loss
he sustains as a result of continuing his participation in a vulnerable activity. Similarly, the more risk
averse a person is, the higher will be the cost to him of bearing the uncertainty. See W. NICHOLSON,
MIC:ROECONOMIC THEORY 73-75 (2d ed. 1979).
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tion, or open preparation by the government for such action, sends a mes-
sage about the future course of government activity. 6 On the basis of that
message and its context,37 individuals form expectations regarding both the
probability of their sustaining a loss and the magnitude of that loss."
In all likelihood, the decisionmaker will be able to obtain only general
estimates of these values. He must first predict the message that will
emerge from the government action in order to identify those who will be
rendered uncertain. 9 With this prediction, it is possible for the deci-
sionmaker then to investigate directly the value of the investments that are
placed at risk and the subjective probability that the uncertain individuals
place on the occurrence of the anticipated loss.4 These determinations, of
course, will be speculative.
Risk aversion adds a second consideration to the calculation of the ex-
pectational losses created by uncertainty. The product of the perceived
magnitude and, probability of harm must be multiplied by a factor that
represents the individual's level of aversion to risk.4 ' The more risk averse
a person is, 42 the higher will be his expectational loss from an uncertainty-
triggering government action,43 and the more he will be willing to spend
36. This is more a characterization than a description of the creation of uncertainty over adverse
government action. A mechanism like this is implicit in Ackerman's concept of uncertainty costs, B.
ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 44-45, and Michelman's concept of demoralization costs, Michelman,
supra note 6, at 1214. It is also implicit in Congress' concern over creating uncertainty by its actions.
See, e.g., 117 CON(;. REc:. 40,049 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Foley) (14 companies stopped research and
development of insecticides because of fear of having future product banned); id. at 40,050-51 (re-
marks of Rep. Poage) (someone must pay for uncertainty).
37. The message is determined by the nature of the government action or preparation, the context
in which the action is taken, and any statement that accompanies the action.
38. See, e.g., 117 CONG. REC. 40,051 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Poage) (discussing level of uncer-
tainty in pesticide industry and recent history of pesticide bans).
39. Both owners of capital and workers can become uncertain regarding government-imposed
losses. The loss anticipated by owners of capital is measured by the expected reduction in the income
stream generated by their investment. Similarly, the loss feared by workers is measured by the ex-
pected reduction in their wages brought about by the anticipated government action. If the anticipated
government action will cause workers to lose their jobs, it is necessary to predict the type of jobs into
which the displaced workers will transfer in order to assess the magnitude of the loss they will sustain.
It is also necessary to take into account the costs of their finding and transferring into a new job.
40. This type of subjective risk assessment is made in the contexts of environmental and occupa-
tional regulation. See Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, Rating the Risks, in ENVIRONMENT, April
1979, at 14 (surveying state of art of subjective risk assessment).
41. W. NICHO.' ON, supra note 35, at 73-75.
42. The decisionmaker could survey a sample of the individuals rendered uncertain in order to
determine their degree of risk aversion.
Direct measurement of risk aversion is likely to be impractical. Two assumptions, however, can be
made about the risk aversion of the individuals rendered uncertain. First, it can be assumed that they
are risk averse, Friedman & Savage, The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk, 56 J. POL.
ECON. 279, 291-92 (1948), and second, it can be assumed that poor individuals are more risk averse
than wealthy ones, id. at 300.
43. Because the sole effect of the; anticipated government action will be to reduce the profitability
of the affected activity, the onset of uncertainty only skews the probability distribution of returns
toward the lower fail of the distribution. This reduces the expected value of an activity to both risk
averters and risk preferrers. See note 16 supra. The assumption of risk aversion allows the deci-
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or forgo in order to alleviate the uncertainty. If no course of action is
available that would alleviate uncertainty at a low enough cost, he will
remain in the activity and internalize the expectational loss.
B. The Response to Uncertainty: The Individual's Cost of Risk-
Reducing Courses of Action
An individual participating in an activity whose profitability has be-
come uncertain due to the possibility of future adverse government action
can respond in any or all of four ways. First, he can remain in the uncer-
tain activity and internalize the cost of uncertainty. Second, he can sell his
interest in the uncertain activity. Third, he can hedge or insure against
the anticipated loss by investing in an activity that will become more prof-
itable, or in an insurance policy that will pay out, if the anticipated gov-
ernment action occurs. Finally, he can remain in the uncertain activity,
but at the same time take measures to reduce the effect of the anticipated
adverse government action. The response or combination of responses that
the uncertain individual selects will be the one that achieves the most risk
reduction for each dollar he spends or forgoes.
44
1. Remaining in the Uncertain Activity
The simplest course of action that is available to the individual partici-
pating in an uncertain activity is to remain in the activity and internalize
the loss. The cost to the individual of that response, or nonresponse, is the
expectational loss attributable to the uncertainty. The higher the
probability that the individual places upon the occurrence of the adverse
government action, the more he expects to lose and the more risk averse
the individual is, the higher that cost will be.
2. Sale or Depreciation of the Uncertain Asset
At the opposite extreme, the individual can sell his interest in the activ-
ity. The cost of selling his interest in the uncertain activity depends on the
price he can receive. Presumably, buyers and sellers are equally aware of
the uncertainty that encumbers the activity. The price of the interest,
therefore, can be expected to fall by an amount approximately equal to
the expectational loss attributable to the risk of bearing the damage associ-
sionmaker to treat the magnitude of losses discounted by their probability as a lower bound of the
expectational loss imposed upon the uncertain individual.
44. Each method of reducing uncertainty entails a marginal cost per "unit" of uncertainty re-
duced. In theory, each unit of uncertainty would be reduced using the method with the lowest cost for
that unit. One method may be used up until the point at which further use of that method would be
more expensive than beginning to use another method.
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ated with the anticipated government action.4 The uncertain individual,
however, can gain if he sells his interest to someone who is less risk
averse, who places a lower probability on the occurrence of adverse gov-
ernment action, or who will lose less than the initial owner if the adverse
action occurs.
If the individual is unwilling to accept the loss associated with selling
the uncertain asset, he may be able to reduce his losses by allowing the
asset to depreciate-in effect, by ceasing to invest in the activity. 4" The
individual who pursues that course of action saves maintenance costs, but
loses the amount by which his asset's profitability declines as a result of
its depreciation. The attractiveness of that course of action depends on the
specifics of that tradeoff.
3. Hedging, Insuring, and Diversifying
In hedging against the risk of a government-induced loss, the individual
remains in the uncertain activity and, at the same time, shifts resources
into another activity that will become more profitable if the anticipated
government action occurs. 47 To achieve a perfect hedge, enough resources
must be shifted into the new activity so that the potential gain in that
activity will offset the potential loss in the initial activity."s If information
about the government action and its possible effects is generally available,
however, it will be costly to construct a hedge. Assets that would increase
in value as a result of the anticipated government action49 will increase in
price upon the onset of uncertainty. Thus, once uncertainty is imposed
upon the owner of an asset, he can alleviate it only at a cost equal to the
amount by which the price of the hedging asset rises.5" On balance, if
information about the potential adverse government action is generally
available, the hedge does not allow the individual to increase the expected
45. Cf. Downs, supra note 17, at 80 (uncertainty about government action reduces marketability
of property). As a result, not many people who experience heightened uncertainty about adverse gov-
ernment action would sell their interests in the uncertain activity.
46. See id. at 79 (uncertainty over urban renewal or highway construction causes owners of prop-
erty to neglect making property improvement). Of course, this can be done only if exhaustible assets
are involved.
47. See R. RIEGEL, J. MILLER, & C. WILLIAMS, supra note 31, at 6-8 (describing hedging
generally).
48. During the period preceding the ban placed on cyclamates in 1969, several soft drink compa-
nies were hedging their investments in diet soft drinks that contained cyclamates by preparing diet soft
drinks that did not contain cyclamates. Within a week, the alternative drinks were on the market.
Charles Adams, president of Coca Cola, Inc., described his company's preparation of a new diet drink
as "taking out insurance." H.R. REP. No. 1070, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1972) (minority views);
Letter from Ralph Nader to Representative Emanuel Celler (Mar. 22, 1972), reprinted in 118 CONG.
REC. 24,881-82 (1972).
49. This assumes that they are generally available on the market.
50. The increase in the variance of an asset can be hedged away, but the decline in its expected
value cannot. See note 16 supra (definition of uncertainty for purposes of this Note).
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value of his investments, but it does allow him to reduce his risk.5 ' Hedg-
ing can increase the value of the uncertain individual's investment, how-
ever, if the individual has generally unavailable information about, or ad-
vantageous access to, hedging assets. For example, that possibility occurs
if a manufacturer prepares to shift to an alternative product when its pri-
mary product is in danger of being banned from the market.
The purchase of an insurance policy that will reimburse the policy-
holder for all losses that are brought about by an anticipated government
action is a course of action equivalent to a hedge. If this type of insurance
is available, its cost will equal the actuarial value of the expected loss.
Like a hedge without an information or access advantage, insurance only
limits the expected loss to the decline in an activity's expected value that
the risk of the adverse government action causes.5 2 It does not change the
expected value. Insurance, moreover, is unlikely to be available for a loss
that is the result of an anticipated government action. 3
A related risk-reducing strategy is to diversify: to acquire interests in
several assets so that, if the anticipated government action is taken, only a
small portion of the individual's total portfolio is impaired. 4 To do this,
however, the individual may have to reduce his exposure in the uncertain
activity. Therefore, if the investment in that activity is indivisible, diversi-
fication may be impossible.
An individual can hedge against the risk of adverse government action
only if he can accurately predict the nature of the action and identify an
activity that would benefit by the action. Diversification is feasible so long
as it is possible to identify an activity that will be unaffected by the gov-
ernment action. The size of the initial uncertain investment relative to the
individual's portfolio, and its divisibility, also determine the viability of
either hedging or diversifying. It must be possible to shift enough re-
sources into other activities so that when the government action is taken,
51. See note 48 supra (example of hedge against cyclamate ban using information and access
advantages).
52. See note 50 supra (only increase in variance of asset, not decline in expected value, can be
hedged away).
53. But see R. RIEGEL, J. MILLER, & C. WILLIAMS, supra note 31, at 82 (Lloyds Associations
willing to write exceptional contracts); N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1980, at 2, col. 1 (Lloyds of London
insured NBC-TV for risk that United States would not participate in 1980 Olympics). An insurable
risk typically exhibits the following characteristics: (1) it must represent the possibility of a real loss,
and there should be no incentive for the insured to increase the possibility of a loss; (2) the loss must
be important; (3) the cause, time, place, and amount of loss must be accurately ascertainable; (4) the
cost of the insurance must not be too high; (5) a large number of individuals must experience the risk;
and (6) the magnitude and probability of the loss must be objectively calculable by the insurer. R.
RIEGEL, J. MILLER, & C. WILLIAMS, supra note 31, at 16-17. The risk of adverse government action,
depending on the context, is likely to fail to meet the third, fourth, fifth, and possibly the sixth
conditions.
54. See J. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 50 (4th ed. 1977) (investor can
reduce riskiness of portfolio by investing in securities whose returns are not perfectly correlated).
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the loss that is sustained is either insignificant in relation to the entire
portfolio or offset by a simultaneous gain in the other assets. If a hedge
can be constructed, or a portfolio diversified, the cost to the uncertain indi-
vidual depends on the profitability of the assets that are acquired, on the
return forgone if the individual divests himself of the initial risky asset,
and on the transaction costs of constructing the new portfolio.'-
4. Safeguarding
To institute a safeguard against the adverse effect of government action
the uncertain individual must predict the nature of the anticipated action
and alter the activity at risk so that it will remain profitable even if the
government takes the action.16 The viability of the safeguard depends on
the availability of a risk-reducing strategy for that activity. 7 If a strategy
exists, its cost to the uncertain individual depends on the cost of the safe-
guard itself and on the probability that it will be successful. The probable
success of the safeguard, in turn, depends on an accurate prediction of the
adverse government action, an important determinant of the attractiveness
of this alternative.
C. The Societal Effect of Uncertainty
Whether the threat of government action renders jobs or capital uncer-
tain, the individuals affected will undertake the most cost-effective risk-
reducing strategy available."' Each of the responses to uncertainty pro-
55. Cf. R. RIEGEL, J. MILLER, & C. WILLIAMS, supra note 31, at 10-11 (putting money into fund
as self-insurance may entail accepting lower returns).
56. See R. MEHR & E. COMMACK, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE 28 (7th ed. 1980) (prevention of
loss as means of risk reduction); R. RIEGEL, J. MILLER, & C. WILLIAMS, supra note 31, at 5 (same);
Ehrich & Becker, Market Insurance, Self-Insurance and Self-Protection, 80 J. POL. ECON. 623, 637-
38 (1972) (analyzing self-protection as it interacts with market insurance and self-insurance). For
instance, if it is feared that the government might tighten a pollution emission standard, a firm whose
production process barely allows it to meet the current standard might respond by investigating ways
to reduce its emissions. If it is successful, it can remain profitable when the standard is changed. An
argument that has been made frequently during congressional debates over compensation is that firms
should engage in this type of activity. See, e.g., 117 CONG. REC. 40,046 (1971) (remarks of Rep.
Evans) (manufacturers should continue to test product while product is on market); 118 CONG. REC.
24,885 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Boland) (indemnification of cyclamate manufacturers would en-
courage industry to reduce research).
57. In many situations, there are no safeguards against an adverse government action. For in-
stance, if the anticipated action is the closing of a military base, there will be very little the community
around the base can do to protect its interests.
58. See R. RIEGEL, J. MILLER, & C. WILLIAMS, supra note 31, at 9 (individual will retain risk
when that is cheapest alternative). If no risk-reducing strategy is more economical than internalizing
the expectational loss, then none will be undertaken.
One congressman argued that a firm that faces the risk of adverse government action will pass on
the cost of the risk to consumers by raising the price of its product. 117 CONG. REC. 4050 (1971)
(remarks of Rep. Poage) (favoring indemnification of owners' banned pesticides; uncertainty regarding
pesticide bans "will add substantially to the cost").
This argument is not unambiguously valid. The heightened risk of adverse government action is not
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duces a societal effect that may or may not be socially desirable. The deci-
sionmaker can predict individuals' responses to a given instance of govern-
ment-induced uncertainty, and can assess the social desirability of those
responses, based on estimates of the relative cost to the uncertain individu-
als of alternative responses. That assessment should be one component of
the decision whether to promise, or to set a precedent for, the provision of
compensation for a class of government-induced losses. If the net effect of
uncertainty in the class of cases under consideration is socially desirable,
the uncertainty effect would not justify the provision of compensation. On
the other hand, if the net effect of uncertainty is socially costly, that cost
must be weighed 9 against the social cost of providing compensation in the
class of cases under consideration.6
1. Retaining the Uncertain Asset
If an owner of capital retains an asset that is subject to the risk of
equivalent to an increase in the variable cost of a product, which could be partially passed on to the
consumer. Rather, it is similar to an increase in the rate of a profits or a property tax. This type of
cost can be directly passed on through increased prices only under limited circumstances. See R.
MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 396-407, 412-21 (1973)
(incidence of corporate profits and property taxes); Harberger, The Incidence of the Corporation
Income Tax, 70 J. POL. ECON. 215 (1962) (path-breaking analysis of incidence of corporate profits
tax). In the short run, a profit-maximizing firm in a perfectly competitive market cannot pass on this
type of cost increase by raising its prices. R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra, at 397, 414. The
same is true of a profit-maximizing monopolist. Id. at 401.
Cost increases of this type can be passed on through higher prices in two situations. First, they can
be passed on under an oligopolistic market structure. This occurs if all firms in the market either
collude or treat the cost increase as a signal to raise prices simultaneously. Id. at 403-04. Second, this
type of cost can be passed on by a monopolist that has not fully exploited its market power. In
response to the cost increase, the restrained monopolist may exploit unused market power. Id. at 403.
In addition, if a firm's labor force is weak and the firm has monopsony power, it may be able to pass
on some of its increased costs to its workers. Id. at 406.
In the long run, however, the consumer will bear a portion of the cost increase. As property in the
uncertain sector depreciates, it will not be fully replaced. New investment in the sector will decline,
and capital will shift out of the uncertain sector and into the rest of the economy. The reason for the
shift is that the expected return from capital in the uncertain sector will have fallen. See note 16 supra
(defining uncertainty). The shift of capital will continue until the net rate of expected return in the
uncertain sector equals that in the rest of the economy. As capital shifts from the uncertain sector into
the rest of the economy, the relative output of the uncertain sector will decrease. Assuming that de-
mand remains constant, this will cause an increase in the relative prices of goods produced in the
uncertain sector. R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra, at 398-400, 414-15.
59. See note 15 supra (discussing other types of costs).
60. Any of these reactions will entail costs to the uncertain individual, which will affect the alloca-
tion of resources to the uncertain sector. To the extent that the uncertain sector becomes less profit-
able, less capital will be attracted to that sector. As a result, output will fall and prices will rise. See
note 58 supra.
The social desirability of this uncertainty-generated reallocation depends on the optimality of the
allocation prior to the onset of uncertainty. If that allocation was optimal, then the injection of uncer-
tainty that is exogenous to the market is socially costly. If the ex ante allocation of resources was
suboptimally high, however, the effect of the uncertainty is to move the allocation of resources toward
optimality. Because of the problem of the "second best," it cannot be concluded from this fact alone
that the reallocation is beneficial. The decisionmaker will have to analyze empirically a particular
reallocation in order to conclude anything about its social desirability.
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adverse government action and internalizes the uncertainty, then the own-
er's expectational loss is a social cost. The same is true of a worker: if a
worker fears losing his job, but chooses to remain in the job and internal-
ize the risk of losing it, his expectational loss is a social cost of the govern-
ment-generated uncertainty. The more specific his skills are to the set of
jobs rendered uncertain, the higher will be his cost of uncertainty. The
total social cost of uncertainty in each situation is equal to the aggregate
of individual expectational losses.
6
1
2. Sale or Depreciation of the Uncertain Asset
If the owner sells the asset, society will bear a cost equal to the differ-
ence between the asset's value prior to the onset of uncertainty and its
value in the hands of the buyer."2 All other things being equal, the greater
this cost, the more the uncertainty effect militates in favor of providing
compensation. The buyer's conduct under uncertainty, however, must also
be considered. If, for example, a buyer of the asset has an advantage in
instituting safeguards against or in hedging against the risk of government
action, the resulting social cost may be lower. 3
Alternatively, the owner of an asset, when faced with uncertainty, may
allow the asset to deteriorate. The social desirability of the deterioration
depends on the initial allocation of resources. If that allocation was opti-
mal, the injection of uncertainty-a factor exogenous to the market-is
socially costly. Conversely, if the ex ante allocation of the uncertain asset
was suboptimally high, the uncertainty moves the allocation of resources
toward optimality."4
Externalities generated by the asset's deterioration are also social costs
of uncertainty." The externalities may be safety or aesthetic hazards for
which the owner is not liable, or they may be product-quality problems of
which consumers are unaware. These costs will continue until the owner
of the deteriorating asset goes out of business or until the uncertainty that
triggered the deterioration subsides. If these costs are expected to be high,
61. Moreover, when the individual cannot alleviate his uncertainty over adverse government ac-
tion, it is possible that he will externalize his apprehension by acts of aggression. See Williamson,
supra note 6, at 119 (aggression is possible response to demoralization brought about by adverse
government action). If an aggressive response is expected, the social cost of that response must also be
taken into account.
62. Society will also incur the transactions cost of the sale.
63. Cf Sax, supra note 22, at 183-84 (one way to accommodate conflicting uses of property is to
impose costs of conflict on party who is expected to sell property interest to third party who can
develop best solution to conflict).
64. This, however, will not necessarily be an improvement. See note 60 supra (theory of second
best).
65. See, e.g., Downs, supra note 17, at 80 (deterioration in quality of life ip area facing uncer-
tainty regarding urban renewal or highway construction).
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the uncertainty effect favors the establishment of a precedent or policy of
providing compensation to those who incur losses as a result of such
action.
For a worker whose job is vulnerable to adverse government action,
changing jobs is analogous to the sale of an asset. Assuming that the ex
ante allocation of labor is optimal, the social cost of the worker's transfer
is equal to the loss in productivity caused by his moving into a job for
which he is less well-suited and by a less qualified worker taking his old
job. The amount of productivity lost depends on the relative skill levels of
the jobs and the relative qualifications of the workers." If the ex ante
allocation of labor in the uncertain sector is suboptimal, the social desira-
bility of the reallocation must be analyzed directly.' 7
The situation of a job being rendered uncertain due to government ac-
tion differs from that of a physical or financial asset being rendered uncer-
tain in two respects. First, because, no worker is likely to be able to hedge
or to safeguard against the adverse effect of government action, a transfer
of "proprietorship" cannot significantly alter the societal effect of uncer-
tainty.68 Second, workers do not have the option of cutting their potential
losses by allowing their uncertain assets to depreciate. Jobs are even more
indivisible than most physical assets. Thus the worker cannot fine tune
the resource reallocation in the way the owner of certain types of capital
can.
69
3. Hedging or Insuring Against the Anticipated Loss
If the owner of an asset hedges against the risk of adverse government
action, there will be a reallocation of resources toward investments that
would benefit from the anticipated action. As always, the social desirabil-
ity of that effect depends upon the ex ante allocation of resources. If the
reallocation of resources is not particularly costly and if the transaction
66. To the extent that the workers are paid for skills that are specific to the uncertain sector, they
will have to accept lower pay when they transfer to jobs outside that sector. Some of the human
capital that they had built up in their old jobs therefore will be lost. The workers will transfer into
jobs that are likely to be lower paying but more secure than their initial jobs, and the skills that they
applied in their previous jobs will be underutilized. With a labor supply less abundant in the uncer-
tain activity, the wage rate will rise. This in turn, will cause a reduction of output in the uncertain
activity.
67. See note 60 supra (discussing societal effect of reallocation of resources).
68. It is possible that the worker who takes over the job will be less risk averse than the original
worker. If so, the societal cost of uncertainty will be somewhat lower. There seems to be no way to
predict, however, whether the new worker will be less risk averse than the original worker or whether
the uncertain job is simply the best job he can find.
69. Theoretically, the worker can spend less time, money, or both developing the skills needed for
the risky job. It seems doubtful, however, that many jobs require such independent acquisition of
skills on the part of the worker.
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costs of hedging are low, the societal effect will be insignificant."0 On the
other hand, if resources flow into assets of low social value, the effect will
be socially costly. For example, if the uncertain individuals take out insur-
ance policies to protect themselves from adverse government action, the
shift of resources produces only the elimination of uncertainty-security
gained at the expense of other goods.7" Thus, the uncertainty effect will
weigh in favor of establishing a policy or precedent of providing compen-
sation to the individuals adversely affected only if the response to uncer-
tainty is expected to entail a socially costly reallocation of resources.
Although compensation may be denied to owners of capital on the
ground that they can hedge or diversify without significant allocative costs,
the same is not true with respect to workers. Their investments at risk are
the knowledge and skills they apply in their jobs. These assets represent
an overwhelming proportion of their "portfolio" and are indivisible."
Thus, even if workers and their employers anticipate the same adverse
government action, the uncertainty effect may favor more strongly a pre-
cedent or policy of compensating workers for a given type of adverse gov-
ernmental action, than a similar precedent or policy of compensating own-
ers of capital.
4. Safeguarding Against the Anticipated Loss
If the owner of capital institutes safeguards against the anticipated ad-
verse government action, the ultimate societal effect of uncertainty de-
70. For example, in response to uncertainty regarding the cyclamate ban, soft-drink companies
invested in developing alternative diet soft drinks. See note 48 supra. Although difficult to determine
empirically, it would appear that this hedge was not socially costly. It may, in fact, have been socially
beneficial.
71. Cf. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 44 (adaptive behavior occurs at expense of forgoing posi-
tive utility).
In principle, workers may be able to reach an agreement with their employer under which the
employer guarantees them a minimum number of hours of work, liberal severance pay, or some other
form of job protection in exchange for a lower wage rate. In effect, they could buy insurance from
their employer. The amount the workers would have to give up would equal the actuarial value of the
risk of their losing their jobs multiplied by a factor that would represent a degree of risk aversion
lying between their own and their employer's aversion to risk.
In practice, however, it is not clear that such risk transfers will occur. The transaction costs of
working out individual contracts that conform to each employee's risk and risk preference would be
high. Therefore, such an arrangement would occur only in firms or industries having an organized
labor force. Even in these industries, it is not certain that a satisfactory risk transfer could be agreed
upon. If the workers differ in their risk or preferences for risk, it is unclear how well a union that
represents the entire group of workers will be able to satisfy its constituents. See D. BOK & J.
DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 112-16 (1970) (accommodation of minority inter-
ests); cf M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 90 (1971) (collective bargaining involves
coercion). In addition, the cost of satisfactory job security may be so high that workers are unable
adequately to protect themselves. They may have to internalize at least part of the uncertainty of
adverse government action.
72. A worker, conceivably, can seek training in another field while remaining at his job as a
means of diversifying his "portfolio", but this is likely to be impracticable.
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pends on the nature of the safeguard and the cost of its implementation.
This course of action will frequently be socially desirable. The nature of
the safeguard response is to convert an activity from a form in which it
conflicts with another activity," thereby possibly requiring government in-
tervention74 into a form in which it does not. Thus, if successful, the safe-
guard promotes the public interest."
The circumstances that give rise to this response are- limited in two
respects. A socially beneficial safeguard can be expected only if the uncer-
tain individual is able, at a sufficiently low cost, to alter his activity to
eliminate its adverse effect on other activities.76 In addition, the safeguard
will be socially desirable only if the uncertain individual can eliminate the
conflict more cheaply than the government can by direct regulation.77 If a
73. See Sax, supra note 22, at 154 (analyzing inextricability of relationships among property
rights).
74. See id. at 175 (describing legislative and administrative resolution of conflicts among property
uses).
75. The creation of uncertainty over an unfavorable government resolution of a conflict between
an individual's activity and the public interest is equivalent to increasing the prospective cost of the
inputs that give rise to the conflict. For instance, if a plant uses a process that risks injury to workers,
and the government generates uncertainty regarding the possibility of stricter safety regulation, the
cost of the process effectively will rise. If substitutes are readily available for the inputs responsible for
the conflict, they will be put into use when the government orders that the activity cease operation. If
no such substitutes exist, the individual who bears the cost of uncertainty will have an incentive to
begin searching for a resolution to the conflict between his activity and the public interest. Cf C.
SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST (1977) (analyzing use of economic incentives to
achieve public goals). Thus, by effectively raising the prospective cost of an input that conflicts with
the public interest, the government can stimulate a private search for a mutual accommodation be-
tween a private activity and the public interest. This scenario comports with the accepted view among
economists that research and development efforts tend to follow increases in the cost of factor inputs.
See R. NELSON, M. PECK, & E. KALACHEK, TECHNOLOGY, ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND PUBLIC POLICY
31-34 (1967) (factor prices influence innovative activity); Binswanger, Induced Technological Change:
Evolution of Thought, in INDUCED INNOVATION: TECHNOLOGY, INSTITUTIONS, AND DEVELOPMENT
13, 23 (H. Binswanger & V. Ruttan eds. 1978) (same); c Schmoakler, Economic Sources of Inven-
tive Activity, 22 J. ECON. HIST. 1 (1962) (society can influence technological advances through market
mechanism).
76. The case of a firm doing research and development on pollution control in response to an
anticipated tightening of emission standards illustrates this type of socially desirable response to un-
certainty. Initially, the firm's operation conflicted with the public interest by polluting the air to a
degree that would be unacceptable in the long run. If successful in finding a way to reduce its emis-
sions at a sufficiently low cost, the firm could remain in business and the community could breathe
cleaner air. Without the firm's efforts, the government would have to choose either the firm or the
cleaner air, but not both.
77. This argument tracks one of the arguments for the strict liabilty of product manufacturers:
because manufacturers are in the best position to avoid, or to pay others to avoid, injuries arising out
of the use of their products, they should bear the cost of those injuries. Calabresi & Hirschoff, To-
ward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972). In the context of uncer-
tainty over adverse government action, the uncertain individual is often in the best position to smooth
the transition that the government action brings about. This minimizes the social costs of the transi-
tion. See Sax, supra note 22, at 177-86 (when one activity interferes with another activity, cost of
conflict should be imposed on party most easily able to innovate in order to accommodate both
activities).
This solution seems to be the theoretical basis of one of Ralph Nader's arguments against indemni-
fication of those who incurred losses as a result of the cyclamate ban. See Letter from Ralph Nader to
Representative Emanuel Celler, supra note 48 ("The government must rely on businessmen for their
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class of individuals responds to uncertainty in this way, the uncertain in-
dividuals' cost will lead to society's gain. Although other considerations
inform the compensation decision,78 the uncertainty effect weighs against
the establishment of a precedent or policy of compensating individuals
who are harned by such action if a socially cost-beneficial safeguard re-
sponse is available.
Unfortunately, the safeguard response is unlikely to be available to
many individuals adversely affected by government action. Workers do not
have control over the activities in which they are employed. They are de-
pendent upon their employer's ability to institute safeguards against ad-
verse government action. In addition, small businesses may be unable to
institute safeguards, even if the safeguards would be cost-beneficial to
larger firms. This may be due to economies of scale in the safeguard tech-
nology. 79 Or, it may be due to the ability of larger firms to reap more
benefit from a safeguard than a smaller firm could reap.80 Thus, even if a
socially desirable safeguard response is possible, the uncertainty effect
supports establishing a precedent or policy of providing compensation to
those individuals who cannot implement the safeguard."
III. The Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act: An Application
of the Framework
The value of the uncertainty effect analysis can be illustrated by exam-
ining the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act (FEPCA).'2 The
FEPCA establishes a legal framework for regulating the development,
manufacture, and use of pesticides. A key feature of the Act is the provi-
part in assuring the safety of their products . . . . There is, given the limited scope of any Federal
agency, no way to completely assure the public health unless the private sector assumes a prudent
responsibility itself.")
It is possible that the imposition of the risk of certain government actions will result in overinvest-
ment in precautionary activity. If this is the case, a solution may be to promise or to establish a
precedent for the provision of partial compensation. See note 17 supra (discussing imperfect
compensation).
78. See notes 11 & 15 supra.
79. See, e.g., F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 411-
23 (2d ed. 1980) (exploring possibility that economies of scale exist in research and development);
Kamien & Schwartz, Market Structure and Innovation, 13 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1, 8-11 (1975)
(economies of scale in research and development up to modest size).
80. See, e.g., R. Nelson & S. Winter, The Schumpeterian Trade-Off Revisited 5-8 (Apr. 1979)
(unpublished paper of ISPS, Yale University) (larger firms can reap more benefit from research and
development than smaller firms).
81. Cf 15 U.S.C. § 636(b)(5)-(7) (1976 & Supp. 111 1979) (providing loans to small businesses
that incur costs as result of capital expenditures undertaken to comply with federal or state laws or as
result of closing of military installation or reduction in federal support). Although Congress was not
explicitly concerned with uncertainty over adverse government action in enacting the Small Business
Act, the effect of providing loans is to reduce this uncertainty. Cf note 17 supra (discussing imperfect
compensation).
82. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136 -136y (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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sion that grants compensation to all individuals who produce or own a
pesticide that is taken off the market.
A. The Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act
The FEPCA provides that all producers of pesticides must register
their products with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).83 In reg-
istering, the manufacturer must submit to the EPA data on the environ-
mental effect of the pesticide. 4 The EPA may register a pesticide only
after it determines that the use of the substance has no unreasonable ad-
verse environmental effect.8 If the EPA subsequently finds that a pesti-
cide causes "unreasonable adverse effects on the environment," it may
cancel the pesticide's registration, and thus ban it from the market."
Under the FEPCA, any person who owns a banned pesticide may re-
ceive an indemnity payment equal to the cost of the pesticide. 7 There is
no provision, however, for compensating workers who lose their jobs as a
result of pesticide bans; no such provision was even considered by Con-
gress. The provision of indemnification was a major point of contention in
both the House of Representatives and the Senate.8 For the most part,
however, the debates over indemnification were unfocused and lacked an
analytic structure. Although participants in the debates alluded to the un-
certainty caused by the cancellation of registrations, 9 the implications of
the uncertainty were not addressed fully.
B. Application of the Uncertainty Effect Analysis
The proposed framework provides a structure for an examination of the
FEPCA's indemnification provision. Uncertainty can arise as a result of
the FEPCA in two ways: first, the enactment of the FEPCA established
the possibility that a pesticide could be banned from the market; and sec-
ond, as more pesticides are banned, the fear that others might be banned
increases. The activities that are rendered uncertain by the government's
threat to ban a pesticide are the use, sale, production, and research and
development of pesticides. Farmers and manufacturers of pesticides along
83. Id. § 136a.
84. Id. § 136a(c)(2).
85. Id. § 136a(c)(5).
86. Id. § 136d(b).
87. Id. § 136m. The only limitation upon who may be indemnified is the exclusion of a person
who "(i) had knowledge of facts which, in themselves, would have shown that such pesticide did not
meet (the registration requirements], and (ii) continued thereafter to produce such pesticide without
giving timely notice of such facts to the Administrator [of the EPA]." Id. § 136m(a).
88. See 118 CONG. REC. 33,922-24 (1972) (Senate debate over conference committee bill; Senate
bill had no indemnity provision); 117 CONG. REC. 40,046-56 (1971) (House floor debate).
89. 117 CONG. REC. 40,050-51 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Poage) (uncertainty will add to cost of
pesticides); id. at 40,051 (remarks of Rep. Poage) ("[Slomeone must pay for uncertainty . . .")
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with the employees of each are the primary groups most likely to be in-
volved in those activities.9 The effect of uncertainty on each group must
be analyzed separately.
1. The Expectational Loss
The expectational loss imposed on farmers by the threat of an uncom-
pensated cancellation of a pesticide's registration is a function of three
factors: the farmers' average inventory of a given pesticide, the probability
that farmers place on the EPA's cancellation of the pesticide's registration,
and the extent to which farmers are risk averse. Because farmers typically
buy a full season's stock of a pesticide at one time, their average inventory
is large." The exact figure could be ascertained by surveying a sample of
farmers. 92 The probability that farmers place on the EPA's banning a
pesticide is probably based on past experience as well as on any publicity
regarding the EPA's current consideration of such action.93 A crude esti-
mate of this figure could be determined by extrapolating from the recent
history of pesticide bans.94 Finally, it can be assumed that all farmers are
risk averse, and that small farmers are more risk averse than operators of
large farms.9 A congressman considering the FEPCA indemnification
provision could therefore ascertain, with a fair degree of specificity, the
expectational loss that is imposed upon farmers by the possibility of a
pesticide's deregistration 6
The expectational loss imposed on pesticide manufacturers will also be
substantial. They stand to lose not only their inventory, but also their
investment in the development, production, and marketing of the pesti-
cide. 7 Because the magnitude of their potential loss is high, the expecta-
90. Dealers in pesticides will also be involved, but their response will add nothing to this illustra-
tion and thus will not be liscussed.
91. See 117 CONG. REC. 40,049 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Goodling).
92. During the debate on the House bill, one congressman estimated that a large farm would have
between $50,000 and $100,000 worth of pesticide in its warehouse. Id. at 40,047 (remarks of Rep.
Teague). Another hypothesized that a farm worth a few thousand dollars could have $1,000 invested
in pesticides. Id. at 40,051 (remarks of Rep. Poage).
93. Participants in the House debate seem to have agreed that uncertainty would be determined
by the history of pesticide bans. See, e.g., id. at 40,048 (remarks of Rep. Foley) (little likelihood that
cancellations will be numerous); id. at 40,050-51 (remarks of Rep. Poage) (uncertainty will be low
because pesticides would not be banned frequently).
94. The publicity, severity, and suddenness of pesticide bans should also be taken into account in
estimating the subjective probability that such bans will occur in the future.
95. See notes 42-43 supra (discussing assumptions that people, in general, are risk averse and that
risk aversion is inversely correlated with wealth).
96. He should take into account, however, the likelihood that expectational losses probably in-
crease immediately following the cancellation of a pesticide's registration.
97. This figure was estimated to be between $4 and $12 million at the time the FEPCA was
being debated. See 117 CONG. REC. 40,049 (1971).
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tional loss of manufacturers will be great."
The expectational loss imposed on farm employees and employees of
pesticide manufacturers depends on the effect a pesticide ban will have on
employment. If the ban increases the probability that workers will lose
their jobs, the expectational loss depends on the availability and attractive-
ness of alternative jobs. The more specialized or geographically isolated
the workers are, the higher their expectational losses will be.
2. The Response to Uncertainty and Its Social Desirability
Farmers. For farmers, only the following responses to uncertainty are
likely to be viable: first, they can continue farming as before and internal-
ize the risk that they will lose the investment in their pesticide inventory;
second, they can buy pesticides as they need them;99 third, they can buy
several different types of pesticides, with the hope that not all of them will
be taken off the market;' ° or fourth, they can sell their farms to people
who can better bear the risk of pesticide bans.
Although the farmers' response or combination of responses cannot be
determined precisely, the first three possibilities probably will be more
prevalent. The alternative of selling their farms would be unattractive to
most farmers, because the price that they could receive is unlikely to be
significantly above the value they place on their farms with the added
uncertainty. A buyer is not likely to value the threat of a pesticide ban
any lower than the initial owner, nor is he likely to have an advantage
over the current farmers in hedging or safeguarding against a pesticide
ban.'
0'
Thus, it appears that farmers will internalize the uncertainty, will
avoid stocking pesticides, or will use several different types of pesticide.
The first two responses are socially costly. Internalization represents a
direct social utility loss; maintaining small inventories represents extra
transaction and transportation costs as well as inefficient inventory man-
agement. The third response, diversification, may represent a decline in
farming efficiency. If it turns out that none of the pesticides are taken off
the market, farms will be inefficient to the extent that some less effective
pesticides were used. On the other hand, if a pesticide is taken off the
market, the fact that farmers have not relied on it exclusively may reduce
98. Cf id. at 40,049 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Kyl) (14 companies had already stopped research-
ing new pesticides because of fear that new product would be taken off market).
99. This is a form of safeguarding against the risk that a pesticide will be banned.
100. This is a way to diversify the investment in pesticides.
101. See p. 1679 supra (seller of uncertain asset can gain only if buyers are less risk averse, place
lower probability on occurrence of adverse government action, or can hedge or institute safeguards
against adverse action more cheaply).
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the disruption caused by the ban. 102 The uncertainty effect, on balance,
probably weighs in favor of a policy of compensating farmers for any pes-
ticide bans. Such a policy would eliminate the socially costly effects of
farmers' bearing the risk of losing the value of their pesticide inventories.
Manufacturers. Manufacturers have wider opportunities and more ef-
fective ways to safeguard and to hedge against losses due to an EPA ban.
By continuing to research the environmental effects of a pesticide after it
has been registered, they can anticipate any problems that will come to
the attention of the EPA and can make the alterations necessary to keep
their product environmentally sound and on the market.103 If no alteration
can correct a problem, they can at least cut their losses by reducing pro-
duction until the EPA decides whether to ban the product. 10 Alterna-
tively, manufacturers can hedge by developing and marketing pesticides in
groups of substitutable products. If one pesticide is banned, the value of its
substitutes, now relieved of competition, will rise."0 5
The overall effect of uncertainty on the pesticide manufacturing indus-
try will be to increase postregistration research and development and to
spread research and development investment over a larger number of
products. The first of these effects is socially beneficial. The manufacturer
can probably discover the environmental effects of its products more
cheaply than can any other party. By forcing him to bear the risk that a
pesticide will be banned, the government can create an incentive for him
to continue testing products while they are on the market.
The social desirability of diversification of research and development
projects is more open to question. The issue is whether it is better to
invest more money in each of a few research projects, or less money in
each of many projects. Although the answer depends on the nature of the
area of research, it is likely that research and development works best
102. Also, to the extent that farmers' demand for a diversified set of pesticides leads to a reduction
in the use of a pesticide that ultimately is banned, society will incur a benefit.
103. This was the primary argument against providing compensation to manufacturers. See, e.g.,
118 CONG. REC. 33,924 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Hart) (indemnity payments reduce incentives of
chemical industry to police itself); 117 CONG. REC. 40,046 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Evans) (manufac-
turers will lose incentive to test once product is on market).
104. Another means of safeguarding might be to stop the development of new, socially desirable
pesticides. Several congressmen urged that this would be the response of the pesticide industry. See,
e.g., 117 CONG. REC. 40,049 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Kyl); id. at 40,053 (remarks of Rep. Aberne-
thy). One congressman reported that 14 companies had already ceased developing new insecticides. Id.
at 40,049 (remarks of Rep. Kyl). Although this response is possible, it is unlikely to predominate for
two reasons. First, the development of new pesticides serves as a hedge against the risk that those on
the market will be condemned. Second, at a certain point, if enough manufacturers stop developing
new pesticides, the prospective profits of a company that does develop such products will be so large
that the retreat will end.
105. If a pesticide manufacturer finds both of these strategies too expensive compared to the ex-
pected gain, it is likely to be acquired by another manufacturer that can either implement the strate-
gies more cheaply or gain more from the strategies once implemented. See. TAN 63 supra (discussing
sale of asset to buyer more capable of hedging or safeguarding).
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when "bets are spread" over several research projects."0 6 Thus, the uncer-
tainty effect weighs against the compensation of pesticide manufacturers
for their losses when their product is banned.
Workers. If uncertainty about a pesticide ban is expected to render jobs
uncertain, it is likely that workers will have no choice but to remain in
their jobs and internalize the expectational loss. No other risk-reducing
strategy is likely to be available. Thus, the social cost of their uncertainty
is the sum of their expectational losses. The size of that cost depends
largely on the number of workers affected and the alternative jobs avail-
able to them. The more jobs placed at risk and the less satisfactory the
alternative jobs are, the more heavily the uncertainty effect will weigh in
favor of compensation.
Conclusion
The government typically assumes the role of regulating the extent to
which one party's actions incidentally affect the interests of other parties.
When it is the government that acts, however, it must regulate the inci-
dental effects on society of its own actions. One incidental effect of a gov-
ernment action, or preparation for action, that imposes losses on a subset
of society is the creation of uncertainty over such losses. This effect can be
alleviated by compensating, or by promising to compensate, individuals
who sustain losses as a result of the government action. The societal im-
pact of uncertainty varies depending on the circumstances surrounding its
creation and on particular characteristics of the individuals who are ren-
dered uncertain. Uncertainty may impose costs that are concentrated on
an identifiable class of individuals, or it may impose diffuse costs upon
society as a whole. Alternatively, uncertainty can be socially beneficial in
situations in which it induces individuals to undertake actions that pro-
mote the public interest. Although the uncertainty effect concerns only
part of the compensation decision, it weighs in favor of providing compen-
sation to individuals who are harmed by government action only if re-
sponses to the action are more costly to society than the provision of com-
pensation. If the uncertainty effect is socially beneficial, it militates against
the provision of compensation.
106. See Nelson & Winter, In Search of a Useful Theory of Innovation, 6 RESEARCH POL'Y 36,
47, 49 (1977).
1693
